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This paper looks at the post financial crisis period, and the relationship between default risk and 
corporate governance for financial firms outside of North America. Default risk is captured through 
both credit default swap spreads (CDS) and the Black-Scholes-Merton Distance-to-Default 
measure (DD). Institutional ownership and board independence negatively relate to DD, while 
insider holdings, CEO duality, and board size positively relate to DD for the complete sample for 
firms.  Not all of these relationships hold when using CDS spreads as a risk gauge.  
Relationships between board-related variables and risk are found to be continent-specific, which 
can explain some of the different risk responses to governance variables across risk measures. In 
particular, for Asian firms, most governance variables are significantly related to default risk. For 
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       The financial crisis of 2007-08 engendered huge losses to many firms worldwide, and has 
been the topic of considerable research in corporate governance for the past several years. However, 
crisis type conditions in many international markets did not end with the US recovery. At the end 
of 2009, with Eurozone member states unable to bail out their over-indebted banks, the European 
Banking Crisis erupted, which gave rise to widespread defaults, and various stopgap banking 
system bailouts. For example, the Allied Irish Bank (AIB) and Bank of Ireland (BoI) in Ireland 
received a €7 billion rescue package in 2009 and recapitalize their assets. Greece’s four biggest 
banks—National Bank of Greece SA, Piraeus Bank SA, Euro-bank Ergasias SA and Alpha Bank 
AE Greek banks have been regular recipients of emergency loans from the European Central Bank. 
Besides European banks, several financial firms in Asia have faced default in the post financial 
crisis period. Aiful Corporation, the Japanese third-largest consumer lender by assets, failed to 
honour maturing of loans in December of 2009 which triggered a restructuring event, and involved 
the payout of credit default swaps insuring $1.3 billion of its debt.1 Neo-China Land Group, an 
investment holding company based in China, was downgraded by Moody’s by three notches to Ca 
in 2009 for failing in a coupon payment of $19.5 million on its outstanding $400 million 2014 
bonds. The IMF has dubbed the post crisis experience of different regions of the world as a 
reflection of the “multispeed global economy” (IMF, 2013). It has been widespread view that these 
conditions can be attributed to important o failures and weaknesses in corporate governance 
arrangements that do not safeguard against excessive risk taking of many financial services 
companies. A number of studies have examined the interaction of governance mechanisms and the 
performance of firms during the 2007-8 crisis period (e.g., Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid, 2012; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens, Hung, Matos, 2012; Liu, Uchida, and Yang, 2012). However, 
few papers have actually look at the performance of non US firms in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Furthermore, we are unaware of any research pertaining to the impact of governance mechanisms 
                                                        
1 See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNC9Jl6hAatg 




on risk for financial firms in countries outside of the US.  
       The purpose of this study is to fill this gap. Similar to Switzer and Wang (2013), we use 
the 5-year CDS spread as a measure of firms’ default risk to explore the relationship between the 
firms’ default risk and corporate governance during post-crisis period. CDS spread has several 
advantages in capturing default probabilities for a number of reasons. First, unlike bonds on which 
spread measures of risk are measured, CDS are not in fixed supply and should be less sensitive to 
liquidity effects. Finally, as Garcia, Alejandro, and Yang (2009) note, unlike corporate bonds, they 
are less susceptible to squeezes or to become “special” with repo rates below market rates for 
similar maturities and credit risks. We consider a sample of firms from 28 different countries and 
analyze the effects of governance variables, controlling for the differences in country development 
and general market conditions, in addition to a set of firm level control variables. We address the 
possibility of selection bias and endogeneity in the analyses. As a robustness test, we also use 
Black-Scholes-Merton 5-year default probability as an alternative measure of firms’ default risk to 
compare with CDS spread in the regressions.   
       We consider five variables to measure a firm’s governance mechanism: institutional 
ownership, insider ownership, board independence, board size, and CEO duality. These are 
common variables used to measure firms’ corporate governance in the extant literature (e.g. 
Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012; Liu, 
Uchida, and Yang, 2012; Switzer and Wang, 2013). We also use instrumental variable estimation 
methods to address the potential endogeneity of institutional ownership. In addition, as a further 
robustness check we also perform the analyses Black-Scholes-Merton Distance-to-Default measure 
as a proxy for default risk. For our complete international sample, we find that institutional 
ownership is negatively related to firms’ default risk, indicating the monitoring effect of institutions 
on the company (Crutchley et al., 1999). Board size, is positively related to CDS spread, which 
suggests that larger boards may induce firms to increase risk-taking. Consistent with Podder et al. 
(2013) who look at insurance firms find that board independence positively affects risk-taking 
behavior for a broader group of financial firms. The results based on the default probability measure 
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are consistent with Switzer and Wang (2013) who find that board independence and board size 
negatively affect firms’ default risk in US financial firms. Finally, we perform the analyses 
separately for European and Asian firms, which account for approximately 90% of the sample. We 
find that part of the relationships from previous regressions still hold for Asian and European firms. 
However, for Asian-firms, as opposed to European-firms, an inverse relationship between board 
independence and firms’ risk is observed, using both the CDS-spread and default-probability 
regressions. While board independence is positively related to CDS spread, it is negatively related 
to default probability. We conjecture that this result may be due to some unobserved characteristics 
of CDS of Asian financial firms. 
       The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 
describes the data and sample construction; Section 4 describes the methodology and provides 
empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature review 
       Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as relationship in which one 
or more owners (the principal(s)) delegate another entity (the agent) to perform some services on 
their behalf. In a corporation, the principals refer to stockholders while the agent refers to the firm’s 
management staff including the CEO. Due to conflicts of interest associated with the separation of 
ownership from control, agents may not act in the best interests of principals. Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) note that governance mechanisms can reduce default risk through mitigating agency costs, 
monitoring managerial performance and reducing information asymmetry between the firm and 
the lenders.  In addition, firm’s risk-taking behavior can also be influenced by such conflicts (see 
e.g. Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997); Pathan (2009); Liu and Jiraporn (2010)) Several 
authors have examined relationships between governance mechanisms on bank performance and 
on risk taking (e.g., Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1992; Anderson and 
Fraser, 2000; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009, 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Thus, in the following review, we try to 
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describe the relationship between corporate governance and firms’ default risk from four important 
aspects of corporate governance: (1) institutional ownership; (2) insider ownership; (3) board 
characteristics; and (4) CEO power. 
 
2.1 Institutional holdings 
       The impact of institutional holdings, or ownership levels on default risk has been 
examined in several papers, with mixed and conflicting results. For example, Crutchley et al. (1999) 
claim that high institutional holdings can enhance the monitoring effect and reduce the agency 
problem. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms with higher institutional holdings benefit 
from lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues, thereby reducing the firm’s 
default risk. In contrast, Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on financial firms’ performance during 2007-2008 financial crisis and find that 
institutional holdings are negatively related to stock returns (see also e.g., Aebi, Sabato, and 
Schmid, 2012). . This suggests that firms with higher institutional ownership were willing to take 
more risk before the crisis, resulting in bad performance during the crisis. Similarly, Switzer and 
Wang (2013) find that institutional ownership has a negative relationship with the credit risk levels 
of US commercial banks, after controlling for firm specific characteristics of such banks.  
       In our research, we hypothesize that institutional ownership negatively relates to firms’ 
default risk, as measured by CDS spread, implying that external monitoring from institutions 
benefits a firm in terms of its risk-taking behavior. We therefore have the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Institutional ownership is negatively related to a firm’s default risk.  
 
2.2 Insider holdings 
       We define insider holdings as the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by 
insiders. Insiders are commonly referred to “management staff” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Similarly, managerial ownership is defined as the percentage ownership by key officers and 
directors in a company (e.g., Anderson and Fraser, 2000, and Liu, Uchida, and Yang, 2012). Liu, 
Uchida, and Yang (2012) use the change in Tobin’s Q as a proxy for change in firm value to explore 
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its association with corporate governance in China during the past global financial crisis. They find 
that managerial holdings are positively associated with firm value changes for state-owned 
enterprises. Their finding is consistent with Li et al. (2007) who show that firms with higher 
managerial ownership outperform those with lower managerial ownership in terms of operating 
and net return on assets. Anderson and Fraser (2000) find mixed results on the relationship between 
bank governance and its risk-taking, measuring managerial holdings as the aggregate percentage 
of shares held by all officers and directors of the bank. Specifically, managerial holdings positively 
affected a firm’s total risk and its specific risk in the late 1980s when the banking industry was 
relatively less regulated and the entire industry was in a state of financial stress. However, in1992 
– 1994 period following legislation (FIRREA and FIDICIA) designed to restrict risk-taking and 
after the industry returned to profitability, managerial holdings were negatively related to the risk 
of those banks. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) also present evidence on banks that banks 
managers with high stock holdings prefer high risk projects. Contrarily, banks managers holding a 
relatively small percentage of shares of the bank tend to reduce bank risk-taking, considering that 
it could maximize their own utility and protect their jobs. In addition, Gorton and Rosen (1992) 
point out that increased insider holdings tend to encourage managers to raise more risk loans than 
relatively safe loans in 1980s.  
       We hypothesize that insider ownership has a positive relationship with firms’ default risk. 
Due to entrenchment effect, managers with higher holdings tend to perform more aggressively, 
thereby increase the default risk of the company: 
H2:  Insider ownership has a positive association with a firm’s default risk.  
 
2.3 Board characteristics and CEO power 
       We use board independence (i.e., the percentage of independent directors in the board) 
and board size (i.e., the number of board members) to describe board characteristics, and use CEO 
duality (i.e., variable measures whether CEO is also the chairman of board or not) to measure CEO 
power.  
       Based on the sample firms that were at the center of financial crisis from 28 countries, 
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Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) find that more independent board is linked with worse stock 
returns, implying that a board with higher proportion of independent directors prefer to raise more 
equity capital at depressed stock prices during the crisis which may result in wealth transfer from 
shareholders to debtholders. In fact their study does show a big loss to those companies during the 
2007-2008 financial crisis. In contrast, Pathan (2009) finds that strong bank boards, particularly 
with small board size and less independent directors, can increase a bank’s risk-taking. When 
concerning firms’ credit ratings, Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) find that board independence 
is positively associated with credit ratings. In other words, the higher percentage of independent 
directors in a board is linked with higher firm’s credit rating and lower default risk. In addition, in 
terms of financial firms and non-financial firms, the evidence shows that board independence 
negatively affects firms’ default risk in financial firms rather than non-financial firms (Switzer and 
Wang, 2013). Furthermore, Switzer and Wang (2013) show again that board independence and 
board size have negative influence on US commercial banks’ default risk. Even when they restrict 
the sample firms to consider the joint effects of all corporate governance variables, the result on 
board size still remain. The same relationship between board size and banks’ buy-and-hold stock 
returns in recent financial crisis is also found by Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012). In measuring 
the board independence, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) also construct an index (higher for more 
independent directors and lower for less independent directors in boards) to measure whether or 
not a board is friendly. They find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards (higher value 
of index) performed significantly worse than other banks during financial crisis, posing a challenge 
to those papers which argue that poor bank governance was the major cause of crisis. 
       According to Imhoff (2003), CEO significantly influences the membership of corporate 
boards and it is normal for the chairman of the board to be either the current or former CEO of a 
company. Since corporate board is built to oversee management on behalf of shareholders, it is 
debatable to have CEO on the board being supervised and serving. Thus, duality can possibly affect 
a firm’s default risk via the influence on membership of corporate boards. Skaife, Collins, and 
LaFond (2006) indicate that CEO power is negatively related to firms’ credit ratings. However, 
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Pathan (2009) uses a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 and finds 
that CEO power, measured by CEO duality, negatively relates to the risk of a bank, implying that 
CEO prefers lower risk when he/she is the chairman of the board in order to protect bank’s 
undiversified assets and his/her fixed salary. Some pervious literature finds no significant relation 
of board independence and CEO power to a firm’s risk (see e.g. Liu, Uchida, and Yang, 2012; Aebi, 
Sabato, and Schmid, 2012). 
       Considering the mixed evidence on board characteristics and CEO power from previous 
literature, we have the following two hypotheses: 
H3:  Board independence and board size are negatively associated with a firm’s default risk; 
H4:  CEO power has no significant influence on a firm’s default risk. 
 
3. Data, variables, and methodology of our research 
3.1 Sample construction 
       Since our research focuses on post–crisis period, we choose our sample from 2010 to 2012. 
Except CDS spread, all of our other data are obtained from Bloomberg database. The year 2007 
and 2008 have been regarded as the period of subprime mortgages (Ryan, 2008; Erkens, Hung, and 
Matos, 2012). However, in order to clarify the boundary of financial crisis without overlapping 
with post financial crisis, we still select year 2010 rather than year 2009, leaving one-year gap 
between two periods.   
       Our sample includes 117 financial firms located outside of North America. Our firm-
selection criteria are as follows. First, we obtain all financial firms outside of North America from 
Bloomberg database. There are 11140 observations in total. Second, we restrict our sample to 
financial firms having traded CDS information from Markit database – a global financial 
information services company providing independent data, valuations and trade processing across 
all asset classes. After merging the two databases, 10993 firms are dropped and the number of 
sample firms reduces to 145. Third, we delete firms with missing data on corporate governance 
and fundamentals from Bloomberg database. Our final sample consists of 117 financial firms. Panel 
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A of Table 1 shows the details.2    
       Panel B of Table 1 describes the distribution of our sample firms based on their legal type, 
using CDS spread and default probability as measures of firm default risk respectively. The four 
sectors of financial firms are Banking, Financial Services, Insurance, and Real Estate, respectively. 
Specifically, in CDS-spread sample, banks account for more than half of the sample with 67 firms 
(57.26%). Besides, the other three sectors respectively take over nearly the same percentage of 
financial firms in our sample (Financial Services: 14.53%; Insurance: 12.82%; Real Estate: 
15.38%).     
       Before we proceed with regressions, we first employ a probit model regression (shown in 
Panel C of Table 1) to test the propensity of sample firms launching the CDS market, by 
incorporating other financial firms without traded CDS. According to the results given by Panel C, 
firms with lower insider holdings and profit, stronger board independence, larger board size, more 
assets, and higher leverage ratios are more apt to enter CDS market. In addition, if the CEO of a 
company is also the chairman of the board, this company would be more inclined to have traded 
CDS. However, these findings would not provide any evidence on judging whether or not our 
sample has any selection bias since the companies with traded CDS in our sample are all the 
financial firms outside of the North America we can find from “Markit”. Furthermore, under the 
consideration that our CDS sample is purely constructed with financial firms having traded CDS, 
we employ the Heckman selection model to take care of the potential problem on selection bias. 
As shown in Panel D of Table 13, the estimate of ρ (_Rho), the correlation between unobserved 
determinants of propensity to enter CDS market and unobserved determinants of CDS spread, is 
insignificant, indicating that selection bias is not a problem in our research. Thus, we will continue 
our regressions using the initial sample we collect. 
       In addition, Table 2 describing the distribution of firms by country is also provided, using 
CDS-spread and default-probability samples respectively. 
                                                        
2 In the selection process, we do not impose other restrictions (e.g. control the firms’ size) on the sample.  
3 Due to the page layout, we did not post the complete Heckman regression result into our paper and this will be   





[Insert Table 1 & Table 2 here] 
 
3.2 Description of variables 
3.2.1 Measurement of firms’ default risk 
       One of the measurements of firms’ default risk in our research is average 5-year Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) spread on highly liquid 5-year maturity CDS contracts. In measuring firms’ 
default risk, literature has used several kinds of variables. For example, z-score (Roy, 1952; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009), the standard deviation of stock returns (Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan, 
1997), credit ratings (Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006; Liu and Jiraporn, 2010), cumulative 
default probabilities (Switzer and Wang, 2013), 5-year CDS spread (Switzer and Wang, 2013), etc. 
A CDS is a contract which provides insurance against the default of a particular company, thus 
CDS can be used to measure companies’ default risk. The higher the CDS spread is, the higher the 
firm’s default risk would be, and vice versa. In a CDS, there are two parties to the contract: the 
buyer of credit protection makes periodic payments to the seller of the credit protection until either 
the contract matures or there is a default event by the company. In exchange for the periodic 
payments made by the buyer, the seller agrees to pay the buyer the difference between the face 
value and the market value of the reference obligation if a credit event occurs. If no default event 
occurs, the protection buyer still makes all the agreed-upon payments. There is a payment to 
compensate for default losses only in the case of a default event (Markit Inc.). The above is the 
basic definition of CDS. As in any swap, the premium (which determines the annuity payments) is 
the rate that equates the expected streams of cash flows that the buyer and the seller make. The 
CDS premium (CDS spread) therefore contains information on the default probability associated 
with a reference entity, since this information is embedded in the expected payment made by the 
protection buyer. Furthermore, CDS is less, although not completely, sensitive to liquidity effects, 
since securities are in fixed supply, while the supply of CDS can be arbitrarily large. Therefore, 
due to lack of restriction on liquidity, CDS provides a better measure of default risk. The data 
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source that we use is from Markit database, the leading provider of CDS data that have been 
employed in studies. 
       However, although CDS is a better measure of firm’s default risk, only a few papers have 
used it in the research on exploring corporate governance and firm’s default risk (see e.g. Switzer 
and Wang (2013) who look at US firms). Thus, one of the contribution of our paper is that we try 
to fill the gap in exploring the relationship between firms’ default risk and corporate governance 
by the use of CDS spread as the measure of risk.  
       The alternative measure of firms’ default risk is the 5-year default probability provided by 
Bloomberg database. According to Bloomberg, the regarding default likelihood model used to 
calculate the 5-year default probability is based on the Merton distance-to-default (DD) measure 
(Merton, 1974), along with additional economically and statistically relevant factors. The smaller 
the DD, the closer the firm is to default or higher default risk. The DD function is shown below 











where 𝑉0 is the total assets value of the firm at time 0; 𝜎 is the asset volatility; 𝜇 is the asset 
drift; 𝐷 is the debt liabilities of the firm; 𝑇 is the time to maturity; 𝐷𝐷 is the distance to default. 
The key insight of the Merton framework is that the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call 
option on the total assets of the firm where the strike price is equal to its liabilities. However, the 
limitation in the original Merton framework is that it assumes that a firm can default only at the 
maturity of firms’ liabilities, which are assumed to be zero coupon bonds. In reality, default can 
occur at any time. Instead, the Bloomberg default likelihood model overcomes this limitation by 
treating equity as a barrier call option to calculate the DD, explicitly incorporating the possibility 
that the firm defaults before the maturity of the debt (Bloomberg). Then Bloomberg use the 
improved DD as one of the key parameters in its model, plus a mapping between DD and actual 
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default rates, to build a nonlinear function of DD over default probability, which is expressed as: 
Default probability = f (distance-to-default) 
Where f is a nonlinear function. Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that while DD is a significant 
predictor of default, it is not a sufficient statistic since the above paper successfully constructs a 
reduced-form model with better predictive properties from the Merton DD model. Thus, 
considering the comments from the above paper, Bloomberg improves its default probability model 
by including additional information regarding different sectors in different industries. In our 
research, we use the Bloomberg 5-year default probability as the second measure of firms’ default 
risk to compare with CDS spread, under the consideration of the potential endogenous problem 
between institutional ownership and CDS spread. 
 
3.2.2 Measurements of corporate governance and firm characteristics 
Institutional ownership: We use institutional stock holdings (insti_holding) as the representative 
of institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions.  
Insider ownership: This variable (insid_holding) is defined as the percentage of outstanding 
shares currently held by corporate insiders. 
Boards and CEO power: To describe board characteristics, we use board independence 
(board_indep), which is defined as the percentage of independent directors in total board 
membership and is one of the most extensively studied board characteristics (Weisbach, 1988), and 
board size (board_size) that is the number of directors on the company's board. In addition, we use 
CEO duality (ceo_duality), a dummy variable indicating whether a company's Chief Executive 
Officer is also the chairman of the Board, to measure how powerful the CEO is in the company.  
       In addition, based on previous literature, we control firm size (total_assets), return on 
assets (roa), leverage (ltd), and price-to-book ratio (pb) (e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Skaife, 
Collins, and LaFond, 2006; Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid, 2012; Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012). The 
frequency of all the data is annual and the detailed definitions of variables and data sources are 




[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
       Table 3 exhibits the Pearson correlation matrix. The biggest absolute value of coefficient 
of correlation between variables lies between board independence and CEO duality at -0.4408, 
which implies that the higher percentage of independent directors in the board, the less likely the 
CEO is to become the chairman of the board and thus avoid CEO power expansion. Besides, the 
second biggest coefficient estimate is the one of CDS spread and default probability, 0.4091. Apart 
from these coefficients, the other coefficients of significant correlations are generally small. 
Overall, there is no seriously high correlation between explanatory variables. Thus, in our research, 
we employ all these variables shown in Table 3 in our regressions.  
 
3.2.3 MSCI indexes 
       The Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indexes are constructed and maintained 
by Morgan Stanley for more than 40 years to measure the macro performance over different 
markets. They can be used as benchmarks for stock funds and used widely in academic research. 
Gupta, Krishnamurti, and Tourani-Rad (2013) use MSCI-EAFE index (one of MSCI indexes) as 
the benchmark to measure the various development in different countries across their global firms’ 
sample and study the impact of internal corporate governance on firm performance during current 
financial crisis. In our study, we choose the MSCI-country index. This index is constructed to 
measure the market performance of every country displayed in the MSCI country list. 
 
3.3 Mean of main variables by country 
       We provide the mean of our main variables used in our research sorted by country, which 
gives us a brief description of those main variables in each country. As we notice in Table 4, Greece 
and Ireland have a slightly higher average 5-year CDS spread compared to other countries. 
Accordingly, we incorporate the country dummy (equals to 1 if it is Greece or Ireland and 0 
otherwise) into the full sample regressions with dummies to test whether these two countries are 
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the outliers. Furthermore, we also find that a Japanese firm in our sample has incredibly high CDS 
spread, due to the occurrence of its default issue. Accordingly, we include another dummy variable 
equals to one if it is the Japanese firm with the highest CDS spread. In the constituent of sample, 
firms from Europe and Asia take up the main percentage of our sample, 52 and 54 firms 
respectively. Thus, we compare the performance of firms from these two continents in our research 
by running separate regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4. Methodology and empirical results 
4.1 Endogeneity tests  
       Institutional holdings are considered to be a potential endogenous variable with respect to 
the CDS spread. We assume in our equation that institutional ownership can affect the CDS spread 
by playing the monitoring role in the company. However, the CDS spread may also affect the 
investment behavior of institutions. For example, if the performance of a firm is poor and its default 
risk rises, institutions may decrease the percentage of their holdings in the company. Thus, if we 
regress CDS spread on the institutional holdings in the same equation, endogeneity problem may 
occur. Accordingly, we introduce two instrumental variables to address the concern that high CDS 
spread may drive away the institutions. These variables are: (1) the membership in the MSCI-
country index; (2) the one-year lag of market-adjusted return on assets of the firm. The first 
instrument is a dummy variable equals to one if the firm is a member in the firm list of MSCI-
country index of the country and zero otherwise. The use of this instrument follows Aggarwal et 
al. (2011), which similarly use membership in the MSCI-world index as an instrumental variable 
for total and foreign institutional ownership. Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that the MSCI 
membership helps a firm attract foreign capital. Thus, MSCI-country index membership is 
correlated with our ownership measurement but not directly correlated to individual firm’s default 
risk. The second instrument is one-year lag of a firm’s adjusted return on assets, i.e. return on assets 
minus MSCI-country index, while MSCI-country index is used as a market benchmark to adjust. 
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The employment of the second instrumental variable is inspired by Cornett et al. (2007), which 
include the lagged market-adjusted return of a firm (i.e., annual firm return minus the return on the 
S&P 500 index). A positive market-adjusted return might encourage institutions to increase the 
investment to the company in the next year. 
       We proceed with endogeneity tests by running the test of over-identifying constraints 
using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (results are shown in Appendix B). 
Considering the potential influence of default issue of that Japanese firm, we have two separate 
results of the same test, with or without the Japanese firm in our sample. According to the over-
identifying tests, the J-statistics are insignificant with probability of 0.4758 and 0.2174 in two cases 
respectively, failing to reject the null hypothesis of the over-identifying constraints of the two 
instrumental variables and meaning that the instruments are valid. Then, we run the GMM 
endogeneity test to see whether those instrumental variables can help address the potential 
endogenous problem or, in other words, if there is any endogeneity problem between institutional 
holdings and CDS spread in our research (results are shown in Appendix B). From the results of 
GMM estimation, we find that the differences in J-statistics are completely insignificant, whether 
we exclude the Japanese firm of high CDS or not.4 That is to say, the endogeneity test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Summarily, using these two instruments, the GMM over-
identifying test and endogeneity test prove that there is no endogeneity concern between 
institutional ownership and CDS spread in our regressions and we will continue using the least 
squares method to conduct our regressions. 
 
4.2 Full sample regressions without constraints 
       We first run regressions with the full sample without introducing any industry dummy 
variables, using the return on MSCI-country index (index_return) as the benchmark of every 
country. In order to compare the results, we use the average 5-year CDS spread (equation 1, 2, 3) 
and 5-year default probability (equation 4, 5, 6) as the measures of a firm’s default risk, respectively. 
                                                        
4 The probabilities of difference are 0.4961 including the Japanese firm and 0.4737 excluding it 
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The 6 equations in Table 4 report the regression results. All the regressions in our research have 
used time (year) fixed effect. Regressions with country fixed effect are also provided in Table 7 
and Table 9. CDS spread and default probability are transformed as Ln[Y / (1-Y)]. Y represents 
CDS spread or Bloomberg default probability. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
       In the regressions of CDS spread in Table 5, the equation 1, 2, and 3, board size and 
institutional holdings of our corporate governance variables show significant relationship with the 
CDS spread. Comparing the equation 4, 5, and 6 using the default probability as the dependent 
variable, nearly all the measures of corporate governance and firms’ fundamentals are significant 
at the 1% significance level. Specifically, higher institutional holdings, higher board independence 
and less insider holdings can lead to lower default probability. Furthermore, if a CEO is 
simultaneously the chairman of the board, the firm’s default risk is higher. These findings are 
consistent with Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) which find that institutions tend to object to firms’ 
managerial decisions that are harmful to shareholders. Congruously, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find a positive relationship between firm value and institutional ownership. Regarding to the insider 
holdings, sometimes corporate insiders may find it personally beneficial to enhance firms’ risk 
taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), implying a positive relationship between insider ownership 
and default probability. In addition, for board independence and CEO power, the findings on default 
probability follow Pathan (2009) and Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), respectively. Even 
though currently those significant relationships are mostly found with firms’ default probability 
and the results displayed on CDS-based regression are insignificant, we cannot claim no 
relationship between corporate governance and firms’ default risk since (1) we have an 
international sample with many financial firms from different countries and many local 
characteristics may exist; (2) we have some “special” firms in our sample such as those firms from 
Greece and Ireland and the Japanese firm with the highest CDS during the three years. Thus, we 
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will further control these two factors in the following regressions. 
 
4.3 Full sample regressions with dummies 
       As firms from Greece and Ireland have average higher CDS spread than do firms from 
other countries in our sample, we include a dummy variable (_st_dummy) equals to one if a firm 
is from Greece or Ireland, zero otherwise. Besides, considering that there is a Japanese firm with 
the incredibly high CDS spread (due to the occurrence of its own default issue), we employ a 
second dummy variable equals to one if a firm is the Japanese firm with the highest CDS spread. 
The empirical results are shown in Table 6 where equation 1, 2, 3, and 4 (equation 4 and 8 delete 
the Japanese firm from the sample) are CDS spread based and the rest are default probability based. 
 
[Insert Table 6 & Table 7 here] 
 
       Different from the former regressions of CDS spread without dummies, insider holdings 
becomes significantly positive at 1% significance level, as shown from equation 3 and 4 of Table 
6. This finding indicates that insiders with a higher percentage of shareholding in the company 
prefer higher risk in order to maximize shareholders’ interest (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990). 
Board size is positively related to CDS spread after including those two dummies. The coefficient 
of board independence, which is inverse from the results in Section 4.2, is now significantly 
positive, indicating that more independent directors there are in the board, the higher a firm’s CDS 
spread will be. This result is consistent with the “wealth transfer” theory of Erkens, Hung, and 
Matos (2012), which find that higher percentage of independent directors in the board is associated 
with worse stock returns during the crisis period. Comparing with the CDS spread based 
regressions, the significant relationships in default probability based regressions still hold after 
including the dummy variables. Differently, while board characteristics have a positive relationship 
with CDS spread, they have a negative relationship with firms’ default probability, suggesting that 
the findings on the relationship between board characteristics and firms’ default risk are mixed with 
the international sample. The results of board independence and board size found on default 
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probability based regressions follow the conclusion of Switzer and Wang (2013) which find that 
board independence negatively affects firms’ default risk. When taking the country fixed effect into 
consideration, the findings are similar (shown in Table 7). 
 
4.4 The continental comparison 
       As we notice in Table 4, firms from European and Asian countries account for the largest 
percentage of the full sample, with 52 and 54 out of 117 firms respectively. Accordingly, we 
compare a sub-sample with only European firms and a sub-sample with only Asian firms in the 
regressions to test the different impacts of corporate governance between them. 
 
[Insert Table 8 & Table 9 here] 
 
       Panel A and Panel B in Table 8 shows the comparison between European firms and Asian 
firms, respectively. Surprisingly, in Panel A, no corporate governance variables are significantly 
related to CDS spread except board size. And many significant relationships between corporate 
governance and default probability now disappear in the regressions on European financial firms. 
Instead, in Panel B, CEO duality and board independence are still significantly and positively 
related to CDS spread. Moreover, the institutional holdings, insider holdings, and board 
characteristics still show significance in the regressions of default probability, but with different 
signs of coefficients from those in CDS based regressions. Based on the results of Table 6, we 
notice that results of board characteristics (inverse direction of coefficients) found in Asian firms 
are consistent with the findings in Table 6, while this inverse relationship between using CDS 
spread and default probability does not appear in European firms. When taking the country fixed 
effect into consideration, the findings are similar (shown in Table 9). 
       Considering all the results we find, we have to mention that the data availability is still a 
limitation to our research. For example, the data on financial firms with traded CDS only consists 




       In this research, we investigate the relationship between firm default risk and corporate 
governance in the post period of 2008 financial crisis, using CDS spread and default probability as 
two alternative measurements of firm default risk. Our research can contribute in three ways: first, 
unlike most literature which focuses on the impact of the crisis during the two serious years (2007-
2008), we provide new evidence on the role of corporate governance during the post financial crisis 
period. Second, as much attention has been drawn on North American markets for the financial 
crisis, instead, we select our study sample from markets outside of North America in order to find 
out what was happening for those financial firms from 2010 to 2012; Third, we use two alternative 
gauges of default risk: CDS spreads and the Black-Scholes-Merton distance to default measure.  
       In the full-sample regressions without constraints, we find that institutional ownership has 
a weak negative relationship with CDS spread, meaning that institutions may have a monitoring 
effect on firms’ risk control around the area outside of North America. After adding the two dummy 
variables into the regressions, insider holdings and board characteristics (board independence and 
board size) become positively related to CDS spread. Unlike the CDS spread, in the regressions 
with default probability, nearly all the corporate governance show significant relationship with firm 
default risk. When comparing the CDS spread with default probability, we find that: the negative 
relationship between institutional holdings and firm default risk holds, but it shows much stronger 
with default probability as the dependent variable, supporting the view that institutions have the 
monitoring effect in firm risk-taking; insider holdings is significantly related to CDS spread and 
default probability; board size always positively relates to CDS spread and default probability; 
board independence, however, is positively related to CDS spread and negatively associated with 
default probability, we find this inverse relationship in regressions with full sample and sub-sample 
with Asian firms. CEO duality has no significant association with CDS spread, except in sub-
sample with Asian firms, but significantly related with default probability. Furthermore, when we 
split the full sample into European firms and Asian firms, those findings in the two sub-samples 
are different, implying a continental difference. In addition, since we have mixed evidence on board 
characteristics, apart from comparing the characteristics of CDS spread and default probability 
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themselves, we should also try to enlarge the size of our sample in the future to avoid any concern 
due to the limit of data.  
       Therefore, future improvements for this research can focus on extending the research time 
period and expanding the sample size. However, based on our sample selection, the 117 financial 















Aebi, Vincent, Gabriele Sabato, and Markus Schmid. "Risk management, corporate governance, 
and bank performance in the financial crisis." Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 12 (2012): 
3213-3226. 
Aggarwal, Reena, Isil Erel, Miguel Ferreira, and Pedro Matos. "Does governance travel around 
the world? Evidence from institutional investors."Journal of Financial Economics 100, no. 1 
(2011): 154-181. 
Anderson, Ronald C., and Donald R. Fraser. "Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health 
of the banking industry." Journal of Banking & Finance24, no. 8 (2000): 1383-1398. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis, Daniel W. Collins, and Ryan LaFond. "The effects of corporate 
governance on firms’ credit ratings." Journal of accounting and economics 42, no. 1 (2006): 203-
243. 
Beltratti, Andrea, and René M. Stulz. "The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks 
perform better?" Journal of Financial Economics 105, no. 1 (2012): 1-17. 
Bharath, Sreedhar T., and Tyler Shumway. "Forecasting default with the Merton distance to 
default model." Review of Financial Studies 21, no. 3 (2008): 1339-1369. 
Bhojraj, Sanjeev, and Partha Sengupta. "Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and 
yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors*." The Journal of Business 76, no. 
3 (2003): 455-475. 
Bloomberg L.P. " Bloomberg credit risk DRSK<go> framework, methodology and usage." 
(2015). Bloomberg database. John Molson School of Business, Concordia University. 20 July, 
2015.  
Brickley, James A., Ronald C. Lease, and Clifford W. Smith. "Ownership structure and voting on 
antitakeover amendments." Journal of financial economics 20 (1988): 267-291. 
 21 
 
Caprio, Gerard, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine. "Governance and bank valuation." Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 16, no. 4 (2007): 584-617. 
Cornett, Marcia Millon, Alan J. Marcus, Anthony Saunders, and Hassan Tehranian. "The impact 
of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance." Journal of Banking & 
Finance 31, no. 6 (2007): 1771-1794. 
Crutchley, Claire E., Marlin RH Jensen, John S. Jahera, and Jennie E. Raymond. "Agency 
problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making: The role of institutional 
ownership." International review of financial analysis 8, no. 2 (1999): 177-197. 
Demsetz, Rebecca S., Marc R. Saidenberg, and Philip E. Strahan. "Agency problems and risk 
taking at banks." FRB of New York Staff Report 29 (1997). 
Erkens, David H., Mingyi Hung, and Pedro Matos. "Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 
financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide."Journal of Corporate 
Finance 18, no. 2 (2012): 389-411. 
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and René M. Stulz. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis." Journal 
of Financial Economics 99, no. 1 (2011): 11-26. 
Ferreira, Miguel A., and Pedro Matos. "The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional 
investors around the world." Journal of Financial Economics 88, no. 3 (2008): 499-533. 
Garcia, Alejandro, and Jun Yang. "Understanding corporate bond spreads using credit default 
swaps." Bank of Canada Review 2009, no. Autumn (2009): 27-35. 
Gorton, Gary, and Richard Rosen. Corporate control, portfolio choice, and the decline of 
banking. No. w4247. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992. 
Gupta, Kartick, Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti, and Alireza Tourani-Rad. "Is corporate governance 
relevant during the financial crisis?." Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money 23 (2013): 85-110. 
 22 
 
Hall, Robert E. "Why does the economy fall to pieces after a financial crisis?" The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (2010): 3-20. 
Imhoff, Gene. "Accounting quality, auditing and corporate governance."Auditing and Corporate 
Governance (January 2003) (2003). 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure." Journal of financial economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305-360. 
Laeven, Luc, and Ross Levine. "Bank governance, regulation and risk taking."Journal of 
Financial Economics 93, no. 2 (2009): 259-275. 
Li, Donghui, Fariborz Moshirian, Pascal Nguyen, and Li-Wen Tan. "Managerial ownership and 
firm performance: Evidence from China's privatizations."Research in International Business and 
Finance 21, no. 3 (2007): 396-413. 
Liu, Chunyan, Konari Uchida, and Yufeng Yang. "Corporate governance and firm value during 
the global financial crisis: Evidence from China." International Review of Financial Analysis 21 
(2012): 70-80. 
Liu, Yixin, and Pornsit Jiraporn. "The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields." Journal 
of Empirical Finance 17, no. 4 (2010): 744-762. 
McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate 
value." Journal of Financial economics 27, no. 2 (1990): 595-612. 
Merton, Robert C. "On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates*." The 
Journal of Finance 29, no. 2 (1974): 449-470. 
Pathan, Shams. "Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking." Journal of Banking & 
Finance 33, no. 7 (2009): 1340-1350. 
 23 
 
Podder, Jyotirmoy, Michael T. Skully, and Kym Brown. "Independent directors and risk taking: 
Evidence from listed US insurance companies." Systemic Risk: Liquidity Risk, Governance and 
Financial Stability (2013). 
Roy, Andrew Donald. "Safety first and the holding of assets." Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society (1952): 431-449. 
Ryan, Stephen G. "Accounting in and for the subprime crisis." The accounting review 83, no. 6 
(2008): 1605-1638. 
Saunders, Anthony, Elizabeth Strock, and Nickolaos G. Travlos. "Ownership structure, 
deregulation, and bank risk taking." the Journal of Finance 45, no. 2 (1990): 643-654. 
Switzer, Lorne N., and Jun Wang. "Default risk estimation, bank credit risk, and corporate 
governance." Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 22, no. 2 (2013): 91-112. 
Switzer, Lorne N., and Jun Wang. "Default risk and corporate governance in financial vs. non-
financial firms." Risk and Decision Analysis 4, no. 4 (2013): 243-253. 




















Table 1: Sample description
Panel A: Sample selection
No. of firms dropped
Bloomberg financial firms  (- North America)
Less
Financial firms without traded CDS 10993
Financial firms without data on CDS spread 2
Final sample
Panel B: Sector distribution of the final sample
% No. %
Banking 221 30.74% 67 57.26%
Financial services 190 26.43% 17 14.53%
Insurance 67 9.32% 15 12.82%
Real estate 241 33.52% 18 15.38%
Total 719 100% 117 100%
Panel C: Probit model












Panel D: Heckman correction
Parameter estimates
Standard Error t Value
-1.5
_Rho: the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to enter CDS market and unobserved determinants 
of CDS spread.
DF Estimate Approx    Pr > |t|
_Rho 1 -0.189567 0.126041 0.1326










roa 1 -2.0428 0.0232
ltd 1 0.9855 <.0001
0.0003
total_assets 1 0.0006 <.0001
<.0001
board_size 1 1.1760 <.0001
0.6725
insid_holding 1 -4.6448 0.0001
CDS-spread sample




















Table 3: Pearson Correlation Test
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The total of all short and long-term assets as reported on the Balance Sheet.total assets
Percentage of Shares Outstanding held by institutions.Based on holdings data collected by Bloomberg.
Percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders. Based on holdings data collected by Bloomberg.




Number of Directors on the company's board, as reported by the company.  Full time Directors only. board size
Dummy variable indicating whether the company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board, as 
reported by the company. 
ceo duality
Variables
CDS premium containing information on the default probability associated with a reference entity, which is 
collected by Markit Inc..
cds spread
Indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets, in percentage. We define return on assets 
as returns divided by total assets each year from 2010 to 2012.
roa
Measures the percentage of long term debt to total assets.  Unit: Actual. It is calculated as: (Long Term 
Borrowings / Total Assets) * 100
ltd










Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INSTI_HOLDING -6.9992 3.165 -2.2115 0.0278
INDEX_RETURN 0.0418 1.1645 0.0359 0.9714
INSID_HOLDING -12.5475 12.3906 -1.0127 0.3121
CEO_DUALITY -2.4383 1.4698 -1.6589 0.0982
BOARD_INDEP -11.4371 6.862 -1.6667 0.0966
BOARD_SIZE 0.6188 0.9042 0.6844 0.4943
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.3373 0.3397 0.993 0.3216
ROA -0.5393 8.1962 -0.0658 0.9476
LTD 1.0387 1.366 0.7604 0.4476
PB 0.4181 0.464 0.9012 0.3682
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INSTI_HOLDING -0.2459 0.3355 -0.7329 0.4642
INDEX_RETURN -0.0931 0.2441 -0.3815 0.7031
INSID_HOLDING 2.7587 1.7322 1.5926 0.1123
CEO_DUALITY 0.0642 0.0849 0.7571 0.4496
BOARD_INDEP 0.2852 0.1429 1.9952 0.047
BOARD_SIZE 0.2838 0.1352 2.1 0.0366
TOTAL_ASSETS -0.0227 0.0269 -0.8417 0.4006
ROA -3.2829 1.1172 -2.9385 0.0036
LTD 0.4359 0.2363 1.845 0.0661
PB -0.1394 0.0512 -2.7229 0.0069
Prob(J-statistic): 0.2174
Panel A: Results including the Japanese highest-CDS firm
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation overidentification tests:
J-statistic: 0.5086
Prob(J-statistic): 0.4758

























Panel A: Results including the Japanese highest-CDS firm
